NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 33 | Number 2

Article 18

2-1-1955

Trial and Appellate Practice -- Improper Comment
by Solicitor in Argument to Jury
Walter Lee Horton Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Walter L. Horton Jr., Trial and Appellate Practice -- Improper Comment by Solicitor in Argument to Jury, 33 N.C. L. Rev. 328 (1955).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol33/iss2/18

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

Trial and Appellate Practice-Improper Comment by Solicitor in
Argument to Jury
What result should follow where on appeal defendant assigns as
error improper comment' of a prejudicial nature by the solicitor in his
argument to the jury, to which defendant has failed to object until
after verdict?
The North Carolina Supreme Court recently2 re-examined this
problem of trial and appellate procedure and reached a decision which
invites examination and comment not only as an example of the court's
avoidance of an undesirable result, but because of questions raised by
the decision as to future appeals under like circumstances.
In the instant case defendant appealed a conviction under the
"drunken driving" statute3 and assigned as error improper comment
by the solicitor in his argument. The tenor of the comments was
to the effect that the defendant was a wealthy intruder, this status
being contrasted with the supposed menial station of the jurors.
Further remarks were purely speculative, unfounded, not based on
evidence introduced at the trial, and clearly outside the limits of proper
summation. 4 There was no objection made at the time, but after the
verdict was rendered defendant moved to set it aside because of the
prejudicial remarks of the solicitor. The motion was refused, the
trial judge asserting that he had endeavored to impress on the jury
that it was their duty to give a man from Texas as fair a trial as a
man from North Carolina and to give a man of means as fair a trial
as a man of no means. The supreme court held that although the defendant's assignment of error could not be sustained because it was
based on an exception not taken in apt time, "to sustain this trial
below would be a manifest injustice to the defendant's right to a fair
1
Speaking of the statute of 1844 which expanded the privilege of counsel
to allow argument of law as well as of fact to the jury, [now N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 84-14 (1950)], Brogden, J. said, "The declaration is broad and comprehensive
and early lent itself to a construction by the profession that the field of jury
argument was unlimited and boundless. Hence, in the course of time it became
necessary for the courts to fence in the field by imposing certain restrictions
upon counsel in presenting causes to the jury. These restrictions are reflected
in certain legal inhibitions imposed by the courts." Conn v. Seaboard Airline
R. R., 201 N. C. 157, 159, 159 S.E. 331, 333 (1931). There is a classification of
these restrictions in the Con case. See also Note, 4 N. C. L. REv. 132 (1926) ;
Note, 28 N. C. L. Rxv. 342 (1949); Sutrvey of Decisions of North Carolina
Supreme Court, 32 N. C. L. Rzv. 380, 438 (1954); Notes, 39 VA. L. REV. 85
(1954), 10 LA. L. REv. 486 (1950).
I State v. Smith, 240 N. C. 631, 83 S.E. 2d 656 (1954).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138 (1953).
'An example of the statements made is: "Just because he is a man of property and can afford a Lincoln car, are you going to allow him to drive through
here and run down your little daughter, or your little son, or your's or your's,
or your's? I say, No I You must find him guilty." State v. Smith, 240 N. C.
631, 633, 83 S.E. 2d 656, 657 (1954).
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and impartial trial." 5 Accordingly, defendant was awarded a new
trial, the court invoking its constitutional power 6 to supervise and control proceedings in the inferior courts.
It is the general rule that objection to improper comment of counsel must be made at some time before verdict in order that it be
assigned as error 7 and the objection if not made is deemed waived
and is lost. The rule requiring objection before verdict is grounded
in the consideration that objection will call the attention of the presiding judge to the remark and enable him to instruct the jury to
disregard the remarks by either interrupting counsel at the time or,
in his discretion, by including this instruction in the charge to the
jury.8 To this extent at least, objection after verdict would be
superfluous. Another reason usually strongly asserted is that the rule
removes the possibility that counsel might speculate on defendant's
chances with the jury in contemplation of later assignment of the
remarks as error on appeal. 9 The lone exception to this rule recognized in prior decisions applies to those cases wherein the death penalty
' State v. Smith, 240 N. C. 631, 636, 83 S. E. 2d 656, 659 (1954).
IN.
C. CoNs -uTIoN Art. IV § 8.
7
State v. Dockery, 238 N. C. 222, 77 S. E. 2d 632 (1953); State v. Lea,

203 N. C. 13, 164 S. E. 737 (1932) ; Perry v. Western N. C. R. R., 128 N. C.

471, 39 S. E. 27 (1901); Holly v. Holly, 94 N. C. 96 (1886). For citations
to other cases see State v. Davenport, 156 N. C. 596, 72 S. E. 7 (1911) and
State v. Tyson, 133 N. C. 192, 45 S. E. 838 (1903). The exception must also
be made in a regular manner. In State v. Wilson, 158 N. C. 599, 73 S. E. 812
(1912), the trial judge permitted the exception to be made in stating the case,
although no exception was noted at the time. The court held that this was too
late and that the judge should not permit it to be made in stating the case. But
cf. Perry v. Western N. C. R. R., 128 N. C. 471, 39 S. E. 27 (1901), where
the court considered an exception which had not been clearly made below but
allowed by the trial court stating that as the trial court had allowed the exception evidently for the purpose of giving the defendant the fullest opportunity
of appeal, the court would examine it in the same spirit in which it was allowed.
In the capital cases the remarks may be considered by the court ex mero motu,
whether presented to it as an exceptive assignment of error or not. State v.
Dockery, 238 N. C. 222, 77 S. E. 2d 623 (1953) and cases cited therein. See
comment on the Dockery case in Survey of Decisions of North Carolina Supreme
Court, 32 N. C. L. REv. 380, 438 (1954). Where the solicitor agrees that the
exception made after verdict and the assignment of error based thereon shall
constitute the case on appeal, this meets the requirements of Rule 21, Rules of
Practice of Supreme Court, 221 N. C. 544 (1942). State v. Hawley, 229 N. C.
167, 48 S. E. 2d 35 (1948) (capital case).
8 State v. Suggs, 89 N. C. 527 (1883).
'"A party will not be permitted to treat with indifference anything said or
done during the trial that may injuriously affect his interests, thus taking the
chance of a favorable verdict, and afterwards, when he has lost, assert for the
first time that he has been prejudiced by what occurred. His silence will be
taken as tacit admission that at the time he thought he was suffering no harm,
but perhaps gaining an advantage, and consequently it will be regarded as a
waiver of his right afterwards to object. Having been silent when he should
have spoken, we will not permit him to speak when by every consideration of
fairness he should be silent. We will not give him two chances. The law
helps those who are vigilant-not those who sleep upon their rights. He who
would save his rights must be prompt in asserting them." State v. Tyson, 133
N. C. 692, 699, 45 S. E. 838, 840 (1903).
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may be imposed.' 0 In those cases it must appear that the prejudice
arising from the remarks of the solicitor is such that its effect could
not have been removed from the minds of the jurors by any instruction that the trial judge might have given."
The corollary to these rules is also discussed in the instant case,
e.g., the duty of the trial judge where counsel in his argument to the
jury exceeds the bounds of propriety.
Even where there is no objection, it is the right and duty of the
trial judge to interfere sua sponte where counsel's comments are be12
yond the bounds of propriety and calculated to prejudice the jury.
This duty is not absolute, however, and failure to interfere even where
the abuse is gross is not reversible error.13 Here again there is an
exception to this general rule in those cases where the death penalty
may be imposed.1 4 Once objection is made, the duty to interfere may
or may not be absolute depending on the nature of the improper comment. It is consistently said that the decision as to whether he will
interfere upon objection to the improper remark, or wait and instruct
the jury at the time of the charge to disregard the remark is a matter
in the discretion of the trial judge.15 If the comment is mere "cross
firing with small shot"' 6 or "harmless,' 7 there is discretion as to when
the trial judge will interfere. However, if the comment is held to
be a "gross abuse of the privilege of counsel and manifestly calculated
to prejudice the jury"' 8 there is a duty resting on the trial judge to
interfere at once when objection is made, stop counsel immediately, and
in
instruct the jury to disregard the remark.' 9 Failure to interfere
20
It
the latter instance is reversible error, but in the former it is not.
would then appear that where the comment is a gross abuse there is
and cases cited
10 State v. Dockery, 238 N. C. 222, 77 S.E. 2d 632 (1953)
State v. Evans, 177 N. C. 564, 98 S.E. 788 (1919).
cf.
But
therein.
"1See note 10 supra.
11Cuthrell v. Greene, 229 N. C. 475, 50 S. E. 2d 525 (1948); Lamborn v.
Hollingsworth, 195 N. C. 350, 142 S.E. 19 (1928); Forbes v. Harrison, 181
N. C. 461, 107 S.E. 19 (1921) ; State v. Davenport, 156 N. C. 596, 72 S.E. 7
(1910); Cawfield v. The Asheville Street R. R., 111 N. C. 597, 16 S.E. 703
(1892).
1"See note 12 supra.
",
State v. Dockery, 238 N. C. 222, 77 S.E. 2d 632 (1953) and cases cited
therein.
11State v. Bowen, 230 N. C. 710, 55 S.E. 2d 466 (1949) ; State v. Brackett,
218 N. C. 369, 11 S.E. 2d 146 (1940); State v. Tucker, 190 N. C. 708, 130
S. E. 72 (1925); State v. Davenport, 156 N. C. 596, 72 S.E. 7 (1911); State
838 (1903).
v. Tyson, 133 N. C. 192, 45 S.'E.
10 State v. Underwood, 77 N. C. 502, 504 (1877).
"'State v. Compo, 233 N. C. 79, 62 S.E. 2d 632 (1953).
" State v. Tyson, 133 N. C. 192, 194, 45 S.E. 838, 839 (1903).
1" State v. Dockery, 238 N. C. 222, 77 S.E. 2d 632 (1953) ; State v. Tucker,
190 N. C. 708, 130 S.E. 721 (1925) ; State v. Peterson, 149 N. C. 533, 63 S.E.
87 (1908); Jenkins v. The North Carolina Ore Dressing Co., 65 N. C. 563
(1871).
"oSee note 19 supra.
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no discretion, and further, that when the court decides that the comment is not prejudicial but harmless, failure of the trial judge to act
at any time is not reversible error.22 The amount of interference neces23
sary upon objection will vary with the nature of the remark.
The burden resting on defendant's counsel to protect and preserve
the legal rights of his client is shifted upon objection to the trial
judge,24 whose duty it then becomes to protect the defendant or the
prejudiced party. This protection is ostensibly available whether objection is made or not, as there is a right and duty resting in the trial
judge to interfere at any time counsel "travels outside the record" 25
or makes unfair comment which is prejudicial. As has been said,
however, it is discretionary with the trial judge as to whether he
chooses to assert this right or exercise this duty without objection.
But, might failure to interfere without objection be reversible error?
Except in the death cases the court has not laid down any tests for
deciding this question but has made only general statements of a prospective nature. 26 Assuming that objectionable comment inconsistent
with orderly justice would be subject to the trial judge's immediate
interference and expurgation, it becomes apparent that the area of
" See note 19 supra.
"State v. Bowen, 230 N. C. 710, 55 S. E. 2d 466 (1949) ; Maney v. Green-

wood, 182 N. C. 579, 109 S.E. 636 (1921).

2 Ordinarily the degree of interference rests in the discretion of the court.
Maney v. Greenwood, 182 N. C. 579, 109 S. E. 636 (1921); State v. Underwood, 77 N. C. 302 (1877). Where the remark is harmless or not prejudicial
under the circumstances, interference sufficient to satisfy the requirement may
be minimal. State v. Underwood, 77 N. C. 302 (1877) (The court said it
was not clear from the record what the trial judge said or whether it was
heard by the jury, but there was no prejudice at any rate). It may amount
to no more than merely stopping counsel. State v. McCourry, 128 N. C. 594,
38 S. E. 883 (1901) (statement by trial judge that he did not remember any
such evidence).
See also State v. Rogers, 94 N. C. 860 (1886); Cannon v.
Morris, 81 N. C. 139 (1879). Cf. State v. Russell, 233 N. C. 487, 64 S. E. 2d
579 (1951); State v. Compo, 233 N. C. 79, 62 S. E. 2d 579 (1951); State v.
Correll, 229 N. C. 640, 50 S. E. 2d 117 (1948); State v. Brackett, 218 N. C.
369, 11 S. E. 2d 146 (1940). Where the abuse is gross, stronger interference is
required. The language should be explicit, positive, and peremptory. Massey v.
Alston, 173 N. C. 215, 91 S. E. 964 (1917) ; State v. Thompson, 217 N. C. 698,
9 S. E. 2d 375 (1948) (Trial judge told jury that he had no recollection of
evidence commented upon by counsel but that the jury would have to depend
on their own recollection. Held insufficient). Nor is explanation by the solicitor sufficient. State v. Buchanan, 216 N. C. 709, 6 S. E. 2d 497 (1939). Cf.
State v. Pfifer, 197 N. C. 729, 150 S. E. 353 (1920).
"'State v. Green, 197 N. C. 624, 150 S. E. 18 (1929) ; Lamborn v. Hollingsworth, 195 N. C. 350, 142 S. E. 19 (1928); Massey .v.Alston, 173 N. C. 215,
91 S. E. 964 (1917).
"Cuthrell v. Greene, 229 N. C. 475, 481, 50 S. E. 2d 525, 529 (1948).
2'"There may be cases where it would be the duty of the judge to stop the
counsel, when his remarks and conduct are in violation of all rules of decorum
and propriety that should be observed in the administration of justice when
nothing the judge could say in his charge to the jury could rectify the wrong
or efface the prejudice produced." Holly v. Holly, 94 N. C. 96, 98 (1886). Cf.
State v. Dockery, 238 N. C. 222, 77 S. E. 2d 632 (1953).
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inquiry is not well defined and the distinguishing line between what
is prejudicial and merely harmless is wavering and at times indistinguishable.2 7 The remark may be prejudicial on its face but allowable within the framework of the case. 28 Accordingly, the nature of
the wrong for which the defendant is being prosecuted and his apparent guilt or innocence may affect the evaluation of the comment, 2D
as may factors most apparent to the trial judge at the time.80 It would
seem that the trial judge is in the best position properly to make this
evaluation but the conclusion is easily drawn that the evaluation is
actually made after the appeal when the court sitting in calm review
decides whether the comment was gross, or whether the trial judge
has sufficiently removed the effect of the prejudicial remark. The
court has assumed' the responsibility for making the evaluation through
the rule that failure of the trial judge to interfere at once upon objection is reversible error where the abuse of counsel is gross.8 ' There
is no discretion in the trial judge unless the comment is clearly harmless. 2 Thus, there would seem to be no real importance attached to
the discretion, as error in its exercise is not reversible error. Whatever the operation of the rule, however, it cannot be denied that it
affords the defendant or prejudiced party the maximum protection of
the court.
The court in avoiding the general rule as to objection before verdict in the instant case has deviated from a clear line of authority.8 3
27 Compare Devries v. Phillips, 63 N. C. 54 (1868)
zoith Maney v. Greenwood,
182
N.
C.
579,
109
S.
E.
636
(1921).
11 "Gentlemen, you are dealing with a small time racketeering gangster"
held not prejudicial in State v. Correll, 229 N. C. 640, 642, 50 S. E. 2d 717,
718 (1948). "The time has come when the decent people in North Carolina
must stand up and defend the virtue and integrity of the fireside, and home
against the vicious assaults of human vultures and wolves" held not prejudicial
in State v. Meares, 182 N. C. 809, 811, 108 S. E. 477, 479 (1921). See also
State v. Steele, 190 N. C. 507, 130 S. E. 308 (1925).
20 Compare State v. McNair, 204 N. C. 106, 169 S. E. 184 (1933) ; State v.
Lea, 203 N. C. 13, 184 S. E. 737 (1932); State v. Ballard, 191 N. C. 122, 131
S. E. 370 (1925) ; State v. Saleeby, 183 N. C. 740, 110 S. E. 844 (1922). Also
see cases cited in footnote 24 and contrast these cases and the cases cited above
with State v. Thompson, 217 N. C. 698, 9 S. E. 2d 375 (1940) ; State v. Pfifer,
197 N. C. 729, 150 S. E. 353 (1929) ; State v. Tucker, 190 N. C. 708, 130 S. E.
720 (1925).
0 Factors apparent to the trial judge:
(1) Did defendant "open the door"
to the argument complained of by the opposing counsel? (2) Did the prosecutor or counsel making the comment "have" the jury at the time? (3) What
was the appearance and manner of the offending counsel when the statement
was made? (4) Tone of voice. (5) Prior conduct of prosecution and defense
in examination and argument. (6) Quality of the jury.
2" State v. Bowen, 230 N. C. 710, 55 S. E. 2d 466 (1949) ; State v. Brackett,
218 N. C. 369, 11 S. E. 2d 146 (1940); State v. Tucker, 190 N. C. 708, 130
S. E. 72 (1925) ; State v. Davenport, 156 N. C. 596, 72 S. E. 7 (1911) ; State v.
Tyson, 133 N. C. 192, 45 S.E. 838 (1903).
22 State v. Compo, 233 N. C. 79, 62 S. E. 2d 632 (1953); State v. Underwood, 77 N. C. 502 (1877).
" State v. Dockery, 238 N. C. 222, 77 S. E. 2d 632 (1953); State v. Lea,
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This rule was applied indiscriminately in the capital and non-capital
cases before the exception in the latter cases was recognized.3 4 Whether the court in recognizing this error ex mero Motu intended to extend
the rule as applied in the capital cases to the non-capital cases is questionable. There is no rational basis for assuming this to be true on
the authority of this decision alone, and those cases where the court
has indicated that it will recognize the defect ex mero motu do not
afford a basis for reaching that conclusion.3 5 In the capital cases as
indicated supra, the reason for the exception to the general rule is
that there is serious doubt that the prejudice could be removed even if
the jurors were instructed to disregard the extraneous remarks. This
would not seem to be the case in the decision under consideration and
no use was made of the test. It might well be inferred, however, from
the fact that the court felt that the instruction here was insufficient,36
in the light of the instruction given, that such was the case. There
is no reason why the jurors might not be as strongly prejudiced in
a non-capital as a capital case, but the positive pronouncement in the
latter is in accord with the rigid scrutiny applied in capital cases where
the decision is cloaked with such finality. Here the error seems to be
that the trial judge, having recognized the error, did not take sufficient
action to remove it, the charge not going far enough in the opiftion of
the court. Earlier cases make it clear that the sufficiency of the corrective action is also within the discretion of the trial court. 37 The
inference could be drawn that there had been an abuse of discretion
by the trial judge, but this discretion is not reviewed, apparently for
the reason that the trial judge acted without objection to the improper
comments.
203 N. C. 13, 164 S. E. 737 (1932) ; Perry v. Western N. C. R. R., 128 N. C.

471, 39 S. E. 27 (1901); Holly v. Holly, 94 N. C. 96 (1886). For citations
to other cases see State v. Davenport, 156 N. C. 596, 72 S. E. 7 (1911); and
State v. Tyson, 133 N. C. 192, 45 S. E. 838 (1903).
11 Compare State v. Dockery, 238 N. C. 222, 77 S. E. 2d 632 (1953) with
State v. Steele, 190 N. C. 507, 130 S. E. 308 (1925).
11 State v. Dockery, 238 N. C. 222, 77 S. E. 2d 632 (1953) ; State v. Hawley,
229 N. C. 167, 48 S. E. 2d 35 (1948) ; State v. Little, 228 N. C. 417, 45 S. E.
2d 542 (1947); State v. Isaacs, 225 N. C. 310, 34 S. E. 2d 410 (1945).
" There were two dissents in the instant case on the point that the charge
of the trial judge was sufficient to allay any prejudice which might have been
roused by the remarks of the solicitor. Bobbitt, J., wrote the dissenting opinion
in which Johnson, J., concurred, arguing strongly that conceding the rules in
the majority opinion were correct, this was not a case for the application of the
remedy applied as the charge to the jury was sufficient. Higgins, J., dissented
on the point that the case was within the general rule and that the exception
came too late. Compare with the charge given in the instant case those approved in State v. Brackett, 218 N. C. 369, 11 S. E. 2d 146 (1940); State v.
McNair, 204 N. C. 106, 169 S. E. 184 (1933); State v. Murdock, 183 N. C.
779, 1 S. E. 610 (1922).
Maney v. Greenwood, 182 N. C. 579, 109 S. E. 636 (1921) ; State v. UnderM7
wood, 77 N. C. 302 (1877).
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Attempting to reason from the" rule applied in those cases where
the trial judge charges the jury ex mero notu, but where there is

reversible error in the charge, throws no light on this matter.38

An

instruction to the jury to disregard the comment of counsel where
there is no abuse must be specially requested regardless of whether
there is or is not objection at the time. 9 This would indicate that
improper comment is not a matter of substance for which error might
be assigned if the charge were insufficient, but this particular point
has not been presented to the court for decision.
It would seem that the defendant in the instant case was extremely
fortunate in having appealed with a favorable set of circumstances.
The examination of the assignment of error was precluded under the
general rule, as the exception came after verdict. On the other hand,
the comment had been recognized below and an attempt made to remove its effect. It was also manifest that the remarks were improper,
and obviously prejudicial. The result would seem to indicate a balancing of a desire for the maintainance of regularity of procedural rules
against circumstances which the court felt required rectification, although prevented from doing so directly by procedural considerations.
In this situation the court resorted to the broader constitutional remedy
40
in the interest of a fair trial.
"8There is error in failing to charge on a substantial feature of the case
regardless of whether a request is made for special instructions. State v.
Puckett, 211 N. C. 66, 189 S. E. 183 (1937); State v. Ellis, 203 N. C. 836,
167 S. E. 67 (1933). The rule is generally stated that failure to charge on substantive features of the case arising on the evidence is prejudicial even in the
absence of request for special instructions. But if subordinate elaboration is
desired, and the instruction is proper as far as it goes, a party deeming more
specific instruction necessary must request it. Thus, failure to charge on matters which the court would consider subordinate elaboration would not be error.
State v. Ardrey, 232 N. C. 721, 62 S. E. 2d 53 (1950); McCall v. Glouster
Lumber Co., 196 N. C. 597, 146 S. E. 579 (1929). This would seem to indicate that, excluding the capital cases, if counsel fails to object to the improper
remark, the trial judge would not be under a duty to charge the jury and the
failure to do so would not be reversible error. Upon objection, where the abuse
is gross and manifestly calculated to prejudice the jury there is no necessity
that the trial judge charge on the matter, having already instructed the jury
to disregard the statement. If the trial judge, therefore, attempted to charge
the jury ex mero otit,
and the charge were insufficient, no error would be
apparent as there is no substantial matter, but subordinate elaboration. Cf.
State v. Steele, 190 N. C. 507, 130 S.E. 308 (1925) ; State v. O'Neal, 29 N. C.
251 (1847).
"0See note 38 supra.
'°"The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review upon appeal, any
decision of the courts below, upon any matter of law or legal inference... .
and the court shall have the power to issue any remedial writ necessary to
give it general supervision and control over the proceedings in the inferior
courts." N. C. CoNsTiTUrroN Art. IV § 8. This power, as applied in the instant case, has been rarely invoked, and those instances in which it was invoked
seemed to present situations where all other legal mechanics were unavailable
to rectify the conflict in opposing rules to the detriment of the party clearly
entitled to relief. In State v. Cochran, 230 N. C. 523, 53 S. E. 2d 663 (1949),
the defendant was clearly innocent of any violation of the law. This case is
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As to the weight counsel might give this case in appealing under
like circumstances, it would seem that there would have to be an extreme abuse of the privilege of counsel in order to elicit this same
response from the court.
The field for speculation is narrow and marked by many obstacles,
and counsel who takes the risk of not interposing objection in apt
time is toying with his client's chances of receiving a favorable jury
verdict, as well as waiving his right to appeal on the basis of the
remarks if the verdict is an adverse one.
WALTER LEE HORTON, JR.

cited by the court in the instant case.
61, 76 S. E. 2d 340 (1953)

See also Elledge v. Welch, 238 N. C.

(Error appeared as to one defendant who had not

appealed. Nevertheless, since the record showed that she was incompetent, her
rights were committed to the care of the court. In the exercise of the supervisory power, the court took jurisdiction in her behalf). In Ange v. Ange, 235
N. C. 506, 71 S. E. 2d 19 (1952) even though the appeal under consideration
was subject to dismissal, the court took jurisdiction to correct error in the
judgment. In the following cases, however, the court refused to alter decisions,
stating that it would only consider questions of law or legal inference, although
it would appear that these cases present as strong a situation for the exercise
of the supervisory power as the instant case: Alston v. Southern Ry. Co., 207
N. C. 114, 176 S. E. 922 (1934) (Refused to alter decision where plaintiff's
attorney had signed a release to the defendant without authority); State v.
Lawrence, 199 N. C. 481, 154 S. E. 741 (1930) (no review of trial judge's
discretion in allowing guards to be stationed outside the courtroom while the
trial was in progress).

